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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey period, courts handed down a number of cases that
highlighted the risk of unintended consequences arising from the drafting
of certain provisions of partnership and limited liability company agree-
ments. For example, courts considered the ramifications of a partner-
ship’s broadly-drafted purpose clause, and the extent to which such clause
could affect a general partner’s liability. In other cases, the courts’ will-
ingness to give great weight to the terms in partnership and LLC agree-
ments underscored the need for careful drafting of such agreements. And
in the context of attorney’s fees, courts highlighted the need for legisla-
tive action to clarify whether LLCs should be treated in the same manner
as corporations. This article is divided into six main sections that explore
* Jeff Dorrill, Partner at Haynes & Boone, LLP; B.A., Baylor University (with hon-
ors); M.A., University of Oklahoma; J.D., Baylor University School of Law (cum laude).
** Matthew Schindel, Partner at Haynes & Boone, LLP; B.A., Vanderbilt University;
J.D., University of Tennessee (summa cum laude).
*** Alex Ingle, Associate at Haynes & Boone, LLP; B.A., Wichita State University;
J.D., Wake Forest University School of Law (magna cum laude).
**** Joshua Lewey, Associate at Haynes & Boone, LLP; B.A., Boston College (summa
cum laude); J.D., Columbia Law School.
339
340 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 2
recent decisions encompassing the following topics: (II) creation of a
partnership; (III) fiduciary duties; (IV) direct versus derivative claims;
(V) alter-ego doctrine; (VI) purpose clauses; and (VII) attorneys’ fees.
II. CREATION OF A PARTNERSHIP
A. SHAFIPOUR V. RISCHON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
The Eastland Court of Appeals rendered an opinion on the existence
of a partnership in the absence of a written agreement.1 In August 2005,
Nassir Shafipour (Shafipour), president of NMV, Inc. (NMV), met with
John L. Hawkins (Hawkins), owner and president of Rischon Develop-
ment Corporation (Rischon), to discuss the development of a tract of raw
land owned by NMV. Hawkins proposed at the meeting that NMV would
sell the property to Rischon for the price of $480,000.00, and that Rischon
would then obtain all necessary zoning variances, secure construction fi-
nancing, and coordinate the eventual development and construction of
duplex residences on the tract.2 Once it completed the residences, Ris-
chon would market and sell the individual units with profits to be split
between Rischon and NMV.3
Hawkins asserted that he left the meeting with an understanding that
Rischon and Shafipour would jointly develop NMV’s property. Shafi-
pour, according to Hawkins, said at the meeting that the development
proposal was a “good idea” and that Shafipour was “ready to do it.”4
Shafipour, however, disputed Hawkins’s recollection of the conversation.
According to Shafipour’s son, who was also present at the meeting, Shafi-
pour does not understand English well, and Shafipour’s son had to trans-
late the conversations with Hawkins and the document contents for his
father. Shafipour’s son claimed that Shafipour had him tell Hawkins not
to “waste our time” with the detailed development proposal since the
property was only for sale. Shafipour also testified that he rejected Ris-
chon’s proposal.5 The parties agreed, however, that no written agreement
was executed at the meeting.6
In September 2005, Hawkins sent NMV a letter in which Hawkins out-
lined the details of the proposal and the anticipated net profits of the
project. Neither Shafipour nor NMV replied to the letter, and Shafipour
denied ever receiving it.7 Hawkins later prepared a draft of a sales con-
tract for the sale of the tract by NMV to Rischon and forwarded the draft
to Shafipour in December 2005 or January 2006. Shafipour did not sign
this contract or any other written agreement with Rischon in connection
1. Shafipour v. Rischon Dev. Corp., No. 11-13-00212-CV, 2015 WL 3454219, at *2
(Tex. App.—Eastland May 29, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
2. Id. at *1.
3. Id.
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with the proposed sale and development of NMV’s property.8 Hawkins
stated that, although nothing was “solidified,” he was working towards
formalizing an agreement with NMV during this period and expected a
written development or partnership agreement would be executed once
the project was “really moving.”9
Despite the absence of any formal contract or written agreement, Haw-
kins pressed forward with the project by submitting preliminary plans to
the city and negotiating with a neighboring landowner for the purchase of
a strip of property that Hawkins believed was necessary to complete the
development.10 Hawkins stated that he spent hundreds of hours working
on the project, and he expected to be paid for his services.11 NMV later
sold the property as an undeveloped parcel to a third party.12
Rischon sued Shafipour, in Shafipour’s individual capacity under vari-
ous theories of recovery, including breach of partnership and breach of
fiduciary duty. The jury found in favor of Rischon at trial, awarding Ris-
chon compensation for services rendered to Shafipour and additional
damages for Rischon’s out-of-pocket costs and attorney’s fees.13 On ap-
peal, Shafipour argued that the evidence was factually insufficient to sup-
port the trial court’s finding that a partnership had been created between
Shafipour and Rischon. Shafipour further argued that, since no enforcea-
ble agreement existed, he owed no fiduciary duty to Rischon and there-
fore he could not have breached any such fiduciary duty.14
The court of appeals analyzed the issue of the existence of a partner-
ship between Rischon and Shafipour.15 Justice Willson noted that the
Texas Revised Partnership Act (TRPA) was in effect at the time of the
events that formed the basis of the lawsuit, and its provisions govern
whether a partnership was created in this case.16 Under the applicable
statute, five factors are used to determine whether a partnership exists by
written or oral agreement:
(1) receipt or right to receive a share of profits of the business;
(2) expression of an intent to be partners in the business;
(3) participation or the right to participate in control of the business;
(4) sharing or agreeing to share:
(A) losses of the business; or
(B) liability for claims by third-parties against the business; and




10. Id. The court of appeals, however, noted that the referenced transaction was not
ultimately consummated. Id. at *6.
11. Id. at *3.
12. Id.
13. Id. at *1.
14. Id. at *6.
15. See id. at *6–9.
16. Id. at *6 n.10.
17. Id. at *6 (quoting TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2 § 6132b-2.03(a) (expired Jan.
1, 2010) (commonly known as the Texas Revised Partnership Act (TRPA))). The court of
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The court of appeals noted that the test is applied by looking at a total-
ity of the circumstances as it relates to the statutory factors, with the first
and third factors carrying the greatest weight.18
The court of appeals held that “there [was] no evidence that Rischon
partnered with Shafipour, individually.”19 Since no partnership existed,
Shafipour neither owed a fiduciary duty to Rischon nor could have
breached his fiduciary duty.20 In its analysis of the first factor under the
TRPA test for a partnership’s existence, the court of appeals noted that
some evidence existed that Rischon and NMV’s representative may have
intended to share profits, citing Hawkins’ proposed split of any net profits
at his initial meeting with Shafipour in August 2005.21 Justice Willson,
however, agreed with Shafipour that Rischon presented no evidence that
Rischon and Shafipour, in Shafipour’s individual capacity, had agreed to
receive a share of any profits.22 The split of the net profits laid out by
Hawkins at the meeting was proposed to be between Rischon and NMV,
not Rischon and Shafipour.23
In its analysis of the second factor, the court of appeals looked at the
speech, writing, and conduct of Hawkins and Rischon to evaluate
whether the parties intended to be partners.24 Justice Willson highlighted
Hawkins’s statement that nothing was “solidified” and his expectation of
formalizing the partnership once the venture was “really moving.”25 De-
spite the uncertain language of Hawkins’ testimony, Justice Willson
stated that there may have been evidence suggesting Rischon intended to
partner with NMV.26 The court of appeals, however, held that Rischon
had introduced no evidence that Rischon intended to partner with Shafi-
pour individually, nor was any evidence introduced showing that Shafi-
pour, as an individual, intended to partner with Rischon.27
In examining the third and fourth factors, the court of appeals looked
to the details of Hawkins’ proposal for the sale and development of the
property.28 The court of appeals gave significant weight to Rischon’s in-
sistence at the initial meeting on NMV’s sale of the land to Rischon as a
condition to the commencement of work, which indicated that Rischon
would have control over both the property and the development work
appeals noted that the list of factors set forth in the TRPA for determining whether a
partnership has been created are the same factors set forth in the current governing statute
under § 152.052 of the Texas Business Organizations Code. See id.; see also TEX. BUS.
ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.052(a) (2013).
18. Shafipour, 2015 WL 3454219, at *6 (citing Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 891
(Tex. 2009)).
19. Id. at *7.




24. Id. at *7.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at *6–7.
28. See id.
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during the project.29 As a result, the court of appeals found that the third
factor was not supported by the evidence.30 Justice Willson concluded
that there was no evidence that Rischon and Shafipour intended to share
of control of the business.31 Further, the court of appeals found that no
evidence was introduced by Rischon relating to the fourth factor’s analy-
sis of whether the parties intended to share the losses of the business.32
In its application of the fifth factor, the court of appeals disagreed with
Rischon’s assertion that Shafipour had agreed to contribute the land into
the alleged partnership.33 Justice Willson noted that the proposal in-
volved the sale of the land by NMV to Rischon, not the partnership, and
there was no mention of any contribution to the partnership by Shafipour
of his interest in NMV.34 Nor did the court of appeals find any evidence
to support a finding that Rischon had contributed to the alleged partner-
ship.35 Because there was no evidence that either party had “contributed
money or property into the alleged partnership,” the court of appeals
held that Rischon’s arguments for support under the fifth factor failed.36
The court of appeals held that none of the five factors for the TRPA
test had been satisfied for the existence of a partnership between Rischon
and Shafipour.37 Since no partnership existed, the court of appeals fur-
ther held that the evidence was legally insufficient for the jury to award
damages under breach of partnership.38 The court of appeals also held
that there was insufficient evidence to support a judgment for breach of
fiduciary duty, or under any other theory of liability asserted by Ris-
chon.39 The judgment of the trial court was reversed and rendered judg-
ment that Rischon take nothing.40
This case emphasizes the necessity of executing a written partnership
agreement to confirm the existence of a partnership and establish the par-
ties subject to the agreement.41 In the absence of a written agreement,
this case further stresses the importance of establishing the nature of the
party, whether as an individual or as an agent of an organization, with
whom a partnership is contemplated before any agreement is reached.42
29. Id. at *6. The court of appeals further noted that Hawkins had complete control
over the work performed in anticipation of the development, such as attempting to secure
variances and permits. Id. The court of appeals also pointed out that the progress reports
on such work, allegedly sent by Hawkins to Shafipour detailing the progress of these vari-
ous projects, did not indicate joint control, because any role Shafipour may have had in
these tasks was passive in nature. Id.
30. Id. at *6–7.
31. Id.




36. Id. (citing Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 899 (Tex. 2009)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at *6, *7, *10.
39. Id. at *10.
40. Id.
41. See id. at *6–7.
42. See id.
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As the court of appeals noted, there was some evidence that Rischon had
intended to enter into a partnership with NMV.43 Rischon, however, as-
serted that the partnership had instead been formed with Shafipour indi-
vidually, and the court found that no evidence had been presented which
could support a finding of the existence of a partnership between Rischon
and Shafipour.44 If Rischon had pled its claims against NMV instead of
Shafipour, it is possible the court of appeals would have reached a differ-
ent conclusion since evidence existed supporting at least two of the fac-
tors under the TRPA test between those parties.45 It is unclear, however,
if this would have been a viable strategy since there is no mention of the
status of NMV or whether it retained any assets following the sale of the
property.46
B. DERRICK PETROLEUM SERVICES V. PLS, INC.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas examined
whether a partnership was created in the absence of a written joint ven-
ture agreement by evaluating the course of conduct of the parties during
the five-year term of a fully-executed memorandum of understanding
(MOU).47 In this case, Derrick Petroleum Services (Derrick) and PLS,
Inc. (PLS) disputed the ownership rights of the jointly branded Derrick/
PLS Oil & Gas Mergers & Acquisitions Database (Derrick/PLS
Database). In the first phase, the district court considered the ownership
of the Derrick/PLS Database and whether the MOU had expired at the
end of its term.48 PLS asserted that a partnership had been formed and,
as a result, that PLS owned a fifty percent interest in the Derrick/PLS
Database and the parties’ obligations to each other continued following
the expiration of the MOU.49
Derrick is an oil and gas research company that was founded as a part-
nership in India in 2006. In 2007, Derrick launched a database (Derrick
Database), which included reports and analyses covering European and
North American oil and gas transactions. Derrick, however, had limited
success marketing the Derrick Database and entered into negotiations
with PLS in 2009 to market the Derrick Database in North America.50
“PLS provides information relating to the oil and gas industry, including
a multiple listing of oil and gas properties for sale, [and] marketing and
advisory services.”51 On October 3, 2009, Derrick and PLS executed the
MOU following edits and revisions proposed by both parties during
43. Id. at *6.
44. Id. at *7.
45. See id. at *6–7.
46. See id.
47. Derrick Petroleum Servs. v. PLS, Inc., No. H-14-1520, 2014 WL 7447229, at *6–11
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2014) (mem. op.).
48. Id. at *1, *19.
49. Id. at *1.
50. Id. at *4
51. Id. (noting that PLS also had developed a proprietary database of North American
oil and gas transactions dating back to 1979).
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negotiations.52
The MOU provided for a term of five years during which the parties
would develop and market a jointly branded Derrick/PLS Database. The
Derrick/PLS Database contained the same content as the original version
Derrick Database plus additional content added by Derrick during the
term of the MOU.53 The MOU contemplated the execution of a written
joint venture agreement for the project, but the negotiation of this agree-
ment stalled, and parties never executed this agreement. The parties,
however, did refer to the project as a “partnership” in the MOU.54
“Emails to potential and existing customers also referred to Derrick and
PLS as partners in providing the [Derrick/PLS Database].”55
Under the terms of the MOU, Derrick’s role was to develop and moni-
tor the Derrick/PLS Database, and PLS’s role was to market the Derrick/
PLS Database in North America.56 During the term of the MOU, Der-
rick added 10,000 new entries into the Derrick/PLS Database. PLS peri-
odically sent suggestions for additional entries, but Derrick conducted the
analysis of those suggestions and made the final decisions on whether to
include those entries in the Derrick/PLS Database. Ultimately, the en-
tries suggested by PLS comprised less than two percent of the content of
the Derrick/PLS Database by the time of the trial.57 With regard to mar-
keting, “PLS had executive discretion to decide which businesses to con-
tact . . . and how to price the subscriptions” to the Derrick/PLS
Database.”58
The parties were each to receive one-half of the gross revenue derived
from the subscriptions for the Derrick/PLS Database. All of the costs in-
volved with the development and monitoring of the Derrick/PLS
Database’s content were borne by Derrick, and all of the costs involved
in marketing and administering the subscriptions were borne by PLS.59
Each month, PLS collected the revenue from subscriptions and sent a
wire transfer to Derrick for half of the gross amount. On rare occasions,
“PLS deducted certain expenses from Derrick’s share of the revenue
before wiring the distribution.”60 Derrick, however, protested in response
to these deductions on the basis that the MOU required a distribution
from the gross amount, placing the responsibility on the parties to net out
their own respective costs and expenses.61 The parties did not share infor-
mation about expenses or calculate whether the project as a whole exper-
ienced a profit or loss in any given month. If one parties’ share of the
52. Id.
53. Id. at *5.
54. Id.
55. Id. at *6.
56. Id.
57. Id. at *7. The total entries suggested by PLS which were ultimately included in the
Branded Database numbered 1,434. Id.
58. Id. at *15.
59. Id. at *6.
60. Id. at *8.
61. Id.
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revenue was less than its costs and expenses, that party would suffer the
full amount of that loss under the MOU.62
PLS provided the limited right of a license to use PLS’s brand and cor-
porate name in connection with the Derrick/PLS Database under the
MOU, but the MOU did not expressly address the ownership of the Der-
rick/PLS Database.63 There is no language stating that either party con-
tributed unfettered rights to its intellectual property. The agreement,
however, did include an “exit mechanism” clause, which stated that “if
Derrick prematurely exited the MOU, it would have to give PLS a copy
of the [Derrick/PLS] Database” for its continued use.64
The district court examined whether a partnership existed between
Derrick and PLS under the TRPA test. While applying the five factors of
the totality of circumstances test, the district court pointed out that the
existence or absence of no single factor is determinative under the test.65
In its examination of the first factor, the district court differentiated
between sharing revenue and sharing profits.66 The parties never calcu-
lated the profits of the unified business. Instead, PLS distributed the gross
revenue in accordance with the MOU, and the parties were responsible
for deducting their own expenses from their share of the gross revenue.
Since no allocations were made for the expenses of the business as a
whole, and instead, were made separately by each party with no account-
ing for the profitability of the unified enterprise, the district court found
that there was no sharing of profits.67
The district court analyzed the second factor by highlighting the lan-
guage used by the parties in the MOU.68 Although the mere use of “joint
venture partners” in the agreement was not necessarily indicative that the
parties intended to be in a partnership, the district court emphasized “the
business expertise of the PLS and Derrick representatives who signed the
MOU.”69 Those same representatives included that specific language in a
document and intended the language to be legally significant.70 Conse-
quently, the district court noted that there is some evidence that the part-
ners intended to create a partnership.71 The district court, however, also
noted that the parties’ actions may also be indicative of their intent to
form a partnership.72 In this case, Derrick and PLS took the required
steps to jointly brand and market the Derrick/PLS Database, but they
failed to take any further actions, such as opening a bank account or filing
taxes under the name of the partnership, which would have evidenced an
62. Id. at *9.
63. Id. at *5.
64. Id. at *10.
65. Id.; see also TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.052(a) (2013).
66. Derrick Petroleum Servs., 2014 WL 7447229, at *13.
67. Id.
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intent to form a partnership.73 For this reason, the district court noted
that the evidence of intent by the parties to form a partnership was
limited.74
In analyzing the third factor, the district court placed significant weight
on the existence of shared responsibilities to determine the whether a
right to participate in the control of a shared business existed.75 Derrick
and PLS operated in silos under the MOU, with each party exercising
executive control over its sphere of responsibilities. The district court
noted that, although PLS had input in Derrick’s development of the Der-
rick/PLS Database, input did not equate to control.76 The district court
found that Derrick and PLS had no shared responsibilities and instead
operated as separate businesses, and neither party had the authority to
make binding decisions within the other’s sphere of responsibility.77 As a
result, the district court held that there was no shared control over a sin-
gle, united business entity.78
Regarding the fourth factor, the MOU stated that each party would
bear losses, in their entirety, only within their respective spheres.79 Addi-
tionally, the district court noted that, under the subscription agreements,
only PLS was liable to third parties.80 Since there was neither an agree-
ment to share net losses of the united venture, nor joint liability for third
party claims against the business, the district court held that the parties
did not agree to share any losses or liability.81
In its analysis of the fifth and final factor, the district court looked to
PLS’s assertions that (1) PLS had contributed a license to its brand to the
alleged partnership; and (2) Derrick contributed the Derrick Database
(which was later converted into the Derrick/PLS Database) to the alleged
partnership.82 The district court noted that, because the property at issue
for both parties was intellectual property, the contribution of that prop-
erty must be in writing.83 The MOU addressed PLS’s provision of a li-
cense for branding and its corporate name. But according to the district
court, the language did not suggest that PLS intended to convey an own-
ership interest in this intellectual property.84 Instead, the district court
found that the intent was to “‘furnish,’ rather than ‘convey ownership
of’” the license for branding and use of PLS’s corporate name.85 Further-
more, the MOU did not explicitly address the ownership of the Derrick/
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at *15.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *15–16.
78. Id.




83. Id. at *17 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 204(b) (2012)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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PLS Database or the contribution of the Derrick Database, and Derrick
maintained control over the Branded Database during the term of the
MOU.86 Because neither the MOU nor any other agreements expressly
relinquished Derrick’s ownership rights, the district court found that Der-
rick had not contributed the Derrick Database or the Derrick/PLS
Database into the alleged partnership.87 The district court also noted that
existence of the “exit mechanism,” which required Derrick to provide
PLS with a copy of the Derrick/PLS Database in the event Derrick exited
the MOU early, indicated that Derrick had not contributed ownership of
the Derrick/PLS Database to the business.88 If ownership was indeed
shared, the district court stated that this provision would be unnecessary
since PLS would already jointly own the property.89 Because neither
party had contributed the intellectual property asserted by PLS to the
alleged partnership, the district court held that PLS had only contributed
the use of a limited license to its brand and that Derrick’s contribution
was limited to access and use of the Derrick Database for the marketing
and development of the Derrick/PLS Database.90 Further, because
neither party made additional expansive contributions, the district court
held that there was some—though limited—evidence of contribution of
property to the alleged partnership.91
Ultimately, the district court found limited support for only two factors
under the TRPA test: the intent by the parties to form a partnership and
the parties’ contribution of property to the partnership.92 Citing the lim-
ited extent of these two factors and an absence of the remaining three
factors, the district court held that Derrick and PLS had not entered into
a partnership.93 The district court further held that the term of the MOU
ended on its expiration date, and that the parties’ business relationship
ended on that same day.94
This case, like Shafipour, stresses the importance of executing a written
partnership agreement.95 If PLS had insisted upon the execution of a for-
mal written partnership agreement, this case would have likely had a dif-
ferent outcome. Businesspersons in Texas should insist on formalizing an
intended partnership in a written agreement executed by the parties. Ad-
ditionally, in the absence of a written partnership agreement, this case
emphasizes the importance of establishing the operation of a single busi-
ness when asserting the creation of a partnership.96 Although there was
86. Id.
87. Id. at *18.
88. Id. at *10.
89. Id.
90. Id. at *17–18.
91. Id.
92. Id. at *18.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id.; Shafipour v. Rischon Dev. Corp., No. 11-13-00212-CV, 2015 WL 3454219,
at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 29, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
96. See Derrick Petroleum Servs., 2014 WL 7447229, at *15–16.
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evidence that the parties had intended to enter into a partnership and
that each had contributed a limited amount of property to that enterprise,
the absence of a single, unified operation eventually doomed PLS’s argu-
ments claiming the existence of a partnership.97
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES
In Plano AMI, L.P. v. Cruz, the Dallas Court of Appeals explored
whether a limited partner’s consent to and participation in the decision to
dissolve a partnership could waive a breach of fiduciary duty owed by
another limited partner who controlled the day-to-day activities of the
partnership.98 Dr. Erwin Cruz (Cruz) participated in two partnerships in
the Dallas area which operated in the medical imaging field.99 One of the
partnerships, NDMI, was dissolved and eventually shut down in 2010, and
Cruz was expelled from the other partnership without compensation for
his shares. Cruz sued his former business associates (NDMI Defendants),
including Mehrdad Ghani (Ghani), for conversion, breaches of fiduciary
duty, and other wrongful conduct and won a $4.7 million verdict at
trial.100
In 2002, Cruz, Ghani, Mark Mendez (Mendez), MCG Group, Inc., and
other physician limited partner investors formed NDMI to operate as a
medical imaging business in the same building as Cruz’s medical office.101
Cruz, Ghani and Mendez each had a particular role in the enterprise:
Cruz pursued patient referrals through relationships with his medical col-
leagues, while Ghani and Mendez handled financial, technical and other
matters. Mendez was later expelled from the partnership, and his interest
was split evenly between Ghani and Cruz.102
Ghani managed the day-to-day activities of the imaging center from its
inception until its dissolution, except during a one-year hiatus in 2006
when NDMI used the services of a management company.103 In spring
2007, NDMI was marketed for sale at a price of $5.9 million, but it failed
to attract a purchaser, and the broker’s contract was terminated in Sep-
tember 2008. By that time, tensions were evident between Cruz and
Ghani over Ghani’s control of the business. Although NDMI was profita-
ble, partnership distribution had stopped and Ghani told Cruz that the
business was in danger due to a drop in referrals and reimbursements.104
Cruz and Ghani, as directors of NDMI’s general partner, adopted a
resolution in December 2008 to wind up NDMI.105 The resolution also
97. See id.
98. Plano AMI, L.P. v. Cruz, No. 05-12-01480-CV, 2015 WL 128592, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Jan. 9, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).




103. Id. at *2.
104. Id.
105. Id. at *3.
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authorized Ghani to oversee the dissolution process. Cruz, as the secre-
tary, signed the minutes of the meeting, while Cruz and Ghani, as part-
ners of NDMI, both signed a consent to the dissolution. Cruz later
approached Ghani to recommend the inclusion of another doctor, Reza
Nabavi (Nabavi), in the partnership.106 Cruz saw Nabavi’s clinics as a
source of new referrals. Ghani, however, explained that it was too late
since the dissolution process was already underway. But shortly after
NDMI shut down in 2010, Cruz learned that Ghani had formed a new
venture with Nabavi and sold NDMI’s equipment to that new venture.107
Moreover, Cruz also noticed that the partnership distributions during the
wind down period also did not closely mirror NDMI’s net income during
that same period.108 At trial, the trial court found in favor of Cruz on a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty by Ghani in the dissolution of
NDMI.109
One of the issues brought by the NDMI Defendants on appeal in-
volved the damages awarded for breach of fiduciary duty in connection
with NDMI’s dissolution.110 The trial court had granted an instructed ver-
dict that the evidence was factually insufficient to support an affirmative
defense of waiver to any breach of fiduciary duty relating to NDMI’s dis-
solution, and the issue was not presented to the jury for its consideration
in the jury charge.111 NDMI asserted that this ruling was in error and that
the trial court should have been allowed to consider whether Cruz had
waived any breach of fiduciary duty because of his consent to the
dissolution.112
To begin its analysis, the court of appeals recognized that waiver is pre-
sent under Texas law when a party intentionally relinquishes a known
right or the party’s conduct is inconsistent with claiming that particular
right.113 The three elements of waiver are: (1) “an existing right”; (2)
“knowledge, whether actual or constructive, or the existence of the
right”; and (3) “an actual intent to relinquish the right.”114 Ghani argued
that Cruz engaged in intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming any
right by Cruz to protest the dissolution of NDMI.115
The court of appeals emphasized the contents of the notice of the spe-
cial meeting, which authorized the dissolution of NDMI and the minutes
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signed by Cruz and discussed the decision to wind down NDMI in detail.
Coupled with the evidence that Cruz had signed a consent authorizing the
dissolution, testimony that Cruz had “went along with” the dissolution
decision, and other evidence that showed Cruz’s participation in the deci-
sion to wind down NDMI, the court of appeals found that there was an
issue of fact as to whether Cruz had waived his right to complain about
the dissolution of NDMI.117 Ghani also produced evidence that Cruz had
knowledge of NDMI’s bleak survival prospects due to a decline in refer-
ring physicians and other factors. The court of appeals highlighted an
email from Cruz to another physician in 2008 discussing the challenging
legislative environment for the business.118
The court of appeals held that, because “more than a scintilla of proba-
tive evidence” existed in support of the Ghani’s affirmative defense of
waiver, the trial court erred in granting an instructed verdict on the issue
and the jury should have been allowed to consider whether Cruz’s actions
waived any breach of fiduciary duty in connection with NDMI’s dissolu-
tion.119 The court of appeals further held that the error was harmful and
remanded the case for further proceedings.120
This case illustrates the importance of a partner affirming in writing,
whether in the consent to dissolution or by a separate instrument, that
any claims to violations of fiduciary duty are not waived during the disso-
lution of a partnership.121 The court of appeals did not analyze the merits
of the breach of fiduciary duty claims, but its holding that a partner may
be found to have waived any breach of fiduciary duty during the winding
down of a business should operate as a red flag for investors to protect
themselves as arrangements are being made to dissolve a business.122
IV. DIRECT VERSUS DERIVATIVE CLAIMS
In In re Margaux City Lights Partners Ltd., the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Texas examined claims from a lawsuit, the
filing of which predated a settlement hearing relating to the dissolution
and liquidation of a limited partnership, to determine if those claims were
direct and may be pursued by the plaintiffs or the claims were derivative
and may only be pursued or released by the partnership’s liquidating plan
agent (Plan Agent).123 Margaux City Lights Partners, Ltd. (MCL) was a
limited partnership, which invested in undeveloped real estate near
downtown Dallas, Texas. In 2010, the existing general partner withdrew
and Malouf Interests, Inc. (Malouf) was appointed in its place.124 Two
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limited partners of MCL, the Elana Spitzberg Trust and JRR Ventures,
Ltd. (Plaintiffs) sued Malouf, Matthew Malouf, and Minerva Partners
Ltd. (Defendant Parties) in 2011, alleging fifteen separate causes of ac-
tion against the Defendant Parties. Each claim was initially brought indi-
vidually by the Plaintiffs and derivatively on MCL’s behalf.125 But shortly
before a hearing in November 2014—a hearing requested by the Plan
Agent for the court’s approval of a settlement plan by and between the
Plan Agent and the Defendant Parties—the Plaintiffs amended their peti-
tion to narrow the counts from fifteen to eight to supposedly remove the
derivative claims from the petition.126 The Plaintiffs alleged, among other
things, that the Defendant Parties made representations and took actions
in breach of MCL’s limited partnership agreement (LPA) and their fidu-
ciary duties owed to the Plaintiffs; and fraudulently induced the Plaintiffs
to enter into the LPA and to participate in the removal of the prior gen-
eral partner of MCL.127
In its analysis of the Plaintiffs’ claims, the bankruptcy court focused on
the nature of the alleged damages.128 Alleged damages to limited part-
ners, which are not separate from the direct injury to the partnership,
including a loss in the value of the partnership, are derivative claims
under Texas law.129 With three exceptions, the bankruptcy court found
that the Plaintiffs’ claims were derivative because the only alleged inju-
ries under those claims were inflicted upon MCL, and the Plaintiffs’ only
alleged harm was the resultant diminution in value of their limited part-
nership interests.130 In nearly all instances, the Plaintiffs failed to plead
that their claims related to a direct injury, rather than an injury suffered
through MCL.131 The bankruptcy court held that these claims were deriv-
ative and could only be pursued or released by the Plan Agent on behalf
of MCL.132
Two exceptions, which the bankruptcy court held to be direct claims,
related to the Plaintiff’s potential tax liability.133 In these claims, Plaintiffs
alleged that the Defendant Parties “failed to timely provide tax returns,
tax information, and other information to the Plaintiffs,” and this failure
prevented the Plaintiffs from timely filing their own tax returns.134 Ac-
cording to the amended petition, the Defendant Parties also allegedly
moved certain property between MCL and a third party entity, which
may have caused errors in the Plaintiffs’ tax returns for that year.135 The
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bankruptcy court found that any resultant damages from such actions
would be individual to the Plaintiffs and not dependent on any damage to
MCL.136 These claims were held to be direct claims and could be pursued
by the Plaintiffs against the Defendant Parties.137
The third exception concerned one of the claims asserted by the Plain-
tiffs of fraudulent inducement.138 The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defen-
dant Parties fraudulently induced their entry into the LPA, which
included the Plaintiffs’ initial investment in MCL.139 The bankruptcy
court distinguished between alleged misrepresentations made after an in-
vestment in a partnership, which may diminish the value of a limited part-
ner’s investment, and misrepresentations made before an investment,
which induced a limited partner to initially invest in the partnership.140
The bankruptcy court held that the alleged fraudulent inducement in an
initial investment by the Plaintiffs involved a direct injury to the Plaintiffs
and did not depend on any damages suffered by MCL.141 The bankruptcy
court explained that any injury caused by these alleged misrepresenta-
tions was not suffered by MCL through Plaintiffs’ investment.142 Instead,
any harm caused by these actions would be limited to the Plaintiffs.143
Additionally, Plaintiffs asserted claims for conspiracy and exemplary
damages based on the other claims in the amended petition. The bank-
ruptcy court held that claims for conspiracy and exemplary damages were
linked to the underlying tort claim.144 If the underlying tort claim had
been found to be derivative, then those claims were the “property of the
MCL estate and could only be pursued or released by the Plan Agent.”145
If the underlying tort claims were direct, then the conspiracy and exem-
plary damage claims linked to those alleged actions were also direct in
nature.146 The only conspiracy and exemplary damage claims, which the
bankruptcy court found to be direct, were those linked to the claims for
tax liability and fraudulent inducement.147
This case illustrates the potential unintended consequences of a lack of
specificity in pleadings. Here, the bankruptcy court required the Plaintiffs
to plead specific damages suffered by a limited partner plaintiff outside of
those injuries suffered directly by the partnership.148 Nearly all of the
Plaintiffs’ claims in In re Margaux City Lights Partners, Ltd. were held to
be facially insufficient to establish individual injury, and in most cases the
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only alleged damages were the result of a diminution in the value of the
Plaintiffs’ partnership interests.149 Many of the claims examined by the
bankruptcy court were found to be vague, perhaps in hopes that the
courts would look to all potential injuries suffered under the stated causes
of action.150 Claims should instead be pled with specificity and allege in-
juries outside of a loss in the investment value of the partnership interest
in order to preserve a suing limited partner’s right to proceed directly
against a defendant.
V. ALTER-EGO DOCTRINE
A. FIDUCIARY NETWORK, LLC V. BUEHLER
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas rendered an
opinion highlighting the importance of carefully drafting the management
provisions of partnership agreements and observing corporate formalities
in complex organizational structures involving multiple layers of subsidi-
ary entities.151 In Fiduciary Network, LLC v. Buehler, the district court
held that Plaintiff Fiduciary Network, LLC (Fiduciary Network) had
made a sufficient preliminary showing of “overlap” between a foreign
corporation and its subsidiary limited partnership to allow the plaintiff to
pursue an “alter ego” theory of personal jurisdiction.152 Using the alter
ego theory, Fiduciary Network sought to impute the corporation’s Texas
contacts to the subsidiary limited partnership and thereby hale the lim-
ited partnership into a Texas court.153 The case serves as an example of
the unintended consequences that may arise from the authority provi-
sions in partnership agreements, and provides guidance on how to con-
duct business through a network of subsidiary entities.
Fiduciary Network sued a Pennsylvania limited partnership (the Part-
nership) that provides investment and wealth management advice, its cor-
porate parent (the Corporate Parent) that operates as a CPA firm, and
the Chairman of the Corporate Parent, alleging that the Partnership hired
a former employee of Fiduciary Network in violation of a non-compete
agreement.154 In response to a motion to dismiss for lack of personal ju-
risdiction, Fiduciary Network argued in favor of personal jurisdiction on a
number of grounds, including (1) the fact that the Corporate Parent filed
a registration to do business in Texas with the Texas Secretary of State;155
(2) the extent of the Corporate Parent’s commercial activity in Texas;156
and (3) the Fiduciary Network’s contention that the alter-ego doctrine
would permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the subsidiary
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Partnership based on the Corporate Parent’s contacts with Texas.157
The district court rejected Fiduciary Network’s argument that the Cor-
porate Parent’s registration to do business in Texas was in itself sufficient
to establish the minimum contacts necessary to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendants.158 The district court also rejected the Fiduciary
Network’s second contention that a theory of “registration plus commer-
cial activity” could be sufficient to justify the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion.159 The district court, however, held that Fiduciary Network had met
its burden of making a “preliminary showing” that the court could prop-
erly exercise personal jurisdiction over the Partnership based on the Par-
ent Corporation’s commercial contacts with Texas, and therefore that
further discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction was warranted.160
The district court also accepted the Fiduciary Network’s argument that
the minimum contacts of the Parent Corporation could be imputed to the
Partnership through the alter-ego doctrine.161 In making this finding, the
district court held that, in order to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
defendant based on the contacts of the Parent Corporation, the Parent
Corporation must show that “the degree of control the parent exercises
must be greater than that normally associated with common ownership
and directorship; the evidence must show that the two entities cease to be
separate so that the corporate fiction should be disregarded to prevent
fraud or injustice.”162 The district court referenced five factors that must
be evaluated in making this determination:
(1) the amount of stock owned by the parent of the subsidiary; (2)
whether the entities have separate headquarters, directors, and of-
ficers; (3) whether corporate formalities are observed; (4) whether
the entities maintain separate accounting systems; and (5) whether
the parent exercises complete control over the subsidiary’s general
policies or daily activities.163
In holding that Fiduciary Network had made a sufficient preliminary
showing that the Partnership was an alter-ego of the Corporate Parent,
the district court noted that the shareholders of the Corporate Parent
established the Partnership, that the partners and members of the Part-
nership were the same as the Corporate Parent, and that the Chairman of
the Corporate Parent had influence over the hiring decisions of the
Partnership.164
This opinion is significant for the guidance it provides to drafters of
partnership agreements and those responsible for ensuring that corporate
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formalities are observed, from the formation of each applicable entity
through the consummation of every transaction. While common owner-
ship and control is permissible and efficient when properly implemented,
this convenience must be supported by careful drafting of the organiza-
tional documents for all entities in the organizational structure, and by a
diligent application of corporate formalities: maintenance of separate cor-
porate minutes for each entity, well-drafted corporate resolutions prop-
erly authorizing all company action, and strict adherence to the company
management provisions in the partnership agreement.165 Failure to prop-
erly draft and comply with the provisions of corporate organizational
documents in a complex organizational structure may lead to unintended
consequences, including, in a worst-case scenario, a court’s consolidation
of the individual corporate entities into one, creating the risk that up-
stream shareholders could be subject to personal jurisdiction in unantici-
pated venues.166
B. COPELAND V. D & J CONSTRUCTION LLC
In Copeland v. D & J Construction LLC, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas handed down a decision that provides gui-
dance on the issue of veil piercing in the context of limited liability com-
panies.167 Plaintiff Bruce Copeland (Copeland) performed business
management and consulting services to the defendant D&J Construction,
LLC (DJ LLC). After completing the work, DJ LLC and individual de-
fendants Johnny, Darrell and Ethel Gray (the Individual Defendants) re-
fused to pay Copeland for his services, and waged a smear campaign
against Copeland, maligning his name and reputation with clients and
vendors across the industry.168 Copeland filed a suit against DJ LLC and
the Individual Defendants, alleging slander, libel, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and a number of quasi-contract claims. DJ LLC and
the Individual Defendants moved to dismiss the Individual Defendants
from the suit, citing the general rule under the Texas Business Organiza-
tion Code (TBOC) that members and managers of a Texas limited liabil-
ity company are not liable for the debts, obligations or liabilities of such
entity.169 In response, Copeland argued that the Individual Defendants
may be held liable under the corporate veil doctrine because DJ LLC was
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the alter ego of one of the Individual Defendants, and the defendants
were “operating a sham and committing fraud upon the public.”170
The district court performed an analysis of the two factors set forth in
§ 21.223 of the Texas Business Organizations Code that must be shown
before a member of a limited liability company may be held liable for the
entity’s obligations: (1) that the member caused the limited liability com-
pany “to be used for the purpose of perpetrating an actual fraud” on the
holder of an obligation of the limited liability company; and (2) that such
fraud was perpetrated “primarily for the direct personal benefit” of the
member.171
As to the “actual fraud” factor of the analysis, the district court stated
that in order to pierce the corporate veil, “the plaintiff must prove dis-
honesty of purpose or intent to deceive.”172 Furthermore, “the actual
fraud must have related specifically to the contract at issue.”173 The dis-
trict court held that the plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to support a find-
ing that the Individual Defendants had the intent to deceive and
therefore perpetrated an actual fraud, because their business plan had
been to receive payment for services rendered by third parties, and there-
after to refuse payment to the third party service providers.174
As to the “direct personal benefit” factor of the analysis, the district
court also found that Copeland alleged sufficient facts, noting Copeland’s
allegation that one of the Individual Defendants, Johnny Gray, was the
sole member of DJ LLC, and furthermore that he used company debit
cards to pay for personal expenses.175 The district court accepted these
factors as evidence that the entity was a mere front used by the Individual
Defendant in question to perpetrate an actual fraud for his own bene-
fit.176 While this case is a particularly blatant example of an abuse of the
limited liability company form, it serves as useful guidance as to how
courts will interpret § 21.223 of the Texas Business Organizations Code in
deciding whether to pierce the veil of a limited liability company and im-
pose liability on a member.
VI. PURPOSE CLAUSES
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals recently decided a case that high-
lights the unexpected consequences that a broadly drafted purpose clause
in an entity’s operating agreement can have in expanding the scope of an
170. Id. at *3.
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entity’s liability for the actions of a member or limited partner.177 In Doc-
tors Hospital at Renaissance, Ltd. v. Andrade, the court of appeals ad-
dressed the question of “whether a limited partnership that owns a
hospital, or its general partner, may be held vicariously liable for the neg-
ligence of a doctor who is a limited partner in the partnership.”178 Appel-
lees Jesus Jaime Andrade and Jessica Andrade (the Andrades) alleged
that their doctor, Rodolfo Lozano (Doctor Lozano), negligently deliv-
ered their daughter Julianna, resulting in permanent injury to the child.
Citing the doctrine of vicarious liability, the Andrades later added as ad-
ditional defendants the limited partnership that owned the hospital at
which the child was born and of which Doctor Lozano was a limited part-
ner (the Hospital LP), and the limited liability company that served as the
general partner of Hospital LP (GP LLC).179
The Hospital LP and GP LLC moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that Doctor Lozano was acting outside of the scope of the pur-
pose of the partnership at the time of the alleged negligence.180 The court
of appeals disagreed, however, finding that the purpose clauses of the
Hospital LP partnership agreement and the GP LLC operating agree-
ment were so broadly drafted that it precluded a finding as a matter of
law that Doctor Lozano was acting outside of the scope of the purpose of
these entities.181 The court of appeals then applied the same logic to its
analysis of the purpose clause in GP LLC’s operating agreement, which
read as follows:
3.01 The Limited Liability Company shall have the powers provided
for a corporation under the Texas Business Corporation Act and a
limited partnership under the Texas Revised Limited Partnership
Act.
3.02 The purpose for which this limited liability company is organ-
ized is to transact any and all lawful business for which limited liabil-
ity companies may be organized under the laws of Texas, including,
but not limited to, the following:
a. To carry on any business or any other legal or lawful activity
allowed by law;
b. To acquire, own, use, convey, and otherwise dispose of and deal
in real or personal property or any interest therein;
c. To manufacture, buy, sell, and generally deal in goods, wares
and merchandise of every class and description;
d. To buy, rent, sell, manufacture, produce, assemble, distribute,
repair, and service any and all products or services in which the
company desires to engage;
177. Doctors Hosp. at Renaissance v. Andrade, No. 13-15-00046-CV, 2015 WL 3799425,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 18, 2015), rev’d, No. 15-0563, 2016 WL 3157535, at
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e. To do such other acts as are incidental to the foregoing or desir-
able in order to accomplish the purpose for which the company
was formed; and
f. To have and exercise all rights and powers that are now or may
hereafter be granted to a limited liability company by law.
3.03 The foregoing shall be construed as objects, purposes and pow-
ers, and enumeration thereof shall not be held to limit or restrict in
any manner the powers hereafter conferred on this limited liability
company by the laws of the State of Texas.
3.04 The company may, in its Regulations, confer powers, not in con-
flict with law, on its Managers and Members in addition to the fore-
going and in addition to the powers and authorities expressly
conferred on them by statute.182
Thus, the purpose clause of GP LLC’s operating agreement was very
broad and could not be said as a matter of law to exclude the practice of
medicine (or any other business activity, for that matter) from the uni-
verse of GP LLC’s permissible business activities.183 Drafters of partner-
ship agreements often choose to grant broad discretion to the general
partner, imparting a greater degree of flexibility to the general partner in
managing the partnership’s business without necessitating an amendment
to the operating agreement for future business activities.184 But as this
case demonstrates, an unintended consequence of this strategy may be to
expose the general partner to greater liability for the acts of limited part-
ners of the partnership.185 Therefore, this case serves as a reminder that
drafters of partnership agreements must be mindful not only of the bene-
fits of granting broad discretion to the general partner in an entity’s pur-
pose clause, but also that the purpose clause should be conceived of as
part of a broader allocation of authority and control among the general
partner and the limited partners that may be structured in such a way as
to manage liability within acceptable limits.
VII. ATTORNEYS’ FEES
In Hoffman v. L&M Arts, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Texas interpreted the fee-shifting provisions of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code § 38.001 to exclude recovery of attorneys’
fees by a prevailing claimant from a limited liability company.186 The case
arose from an alleged breach of a confidentiality agreement between
Marguerite Hoffman, noted Dallas resident and patroness of the arts,
against L&M Arts (L&M), Sotheby’s auction house, and others.187 Hoff-
man once owned Mark Rothko’s 1961 abstract oil painting, Untitled.188
182. Id. at *8 n.5.
183. Id. at *7.
184. See id. at *4.
185. See id. at *7–8.
186. Hoffman v. L & M Arts, No. 3:10-CV-0953-D, 2015 WL 1000838, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
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Hoffman’s ownership of the Rothko painting was well known, because
the painting had been part of a special art exhibition at the Dallas Mu-
seum of Art that featured numerous works of art from the Hoffman fam-
ily’s private collection. After the death of Robert Hoffman, Marguerite’s
husband and founder of the National Lampoon, the Hoffman family
faced financial uncertainty and decided to sell the Rothko painting.189
Hoffman opted for a private, confidential sale to avoid the embarrass-
ment of publicly disclosing the family’s decision to sell the painting, even
though the publicity surrounding a public auction would have generated a
significantly higher sale price.190 L&M, a Delaware limited liability com-
pany, acted as agent for Hoffman, and the Rothko painting was quietly
sold to an undisclosed buyer. The terms of the sale included a $17.6 mil-
lion dollar selling price, a $500,000 anonymous contribution to the Dallas
Museum of Art, and various confidentiality requirements.191
Three years after the sale, the undisclosed buyer (now known to be
wealthy Mexican financier David Martinez) sold the Rothko painting at a
public auction at Sotheby’s in New York for $31.4 million—a profit of
over $12 million.192 Hoffman sued Martinez and L&M for breach of the
confidentiality provisions of the contract of sale. Hoffman also sued
Sotheby’s for tortious interference with contract, alleging that the auction
house had encouraged Martinez to break the confidentiality provisions of
the Hoffman agreement in order to auction a big-name painting like the
1961 Rothko.193
After obtaining a judgment in the amount of $500,000 against L&M,
Hoffman sought to recover attorneys’ fees from L&M under Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code § 38.001.194 L&M argued that § 38.001 does
not permit recovery of attorneys’ fees from a limited liability company,
but only from an individual or corporation.195 The district court agreed,
basing its decision on an analysis of the legislative intent behind § 38.001
and the plain meaning of “individual” and “corporation” contained in the
statute and elsewhere under Texas law.196 The district court ultimately
concluded that a “person”—including an individual, partnership, limited
liability company, and corporation—could recover fees only from an indi-
vidual person or a corporation but that a limited liability company did not
189. Id.
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qualify either as an individual or a corporation.197
The Texas Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on the scope of
§ 38.001, which provides for the recovery of attorney’s fees, and a recent
bill in the Texas legislature designed to expand the scope of § 38.001 to
include LLCs died in committee. Until further action is taken to broaden
the scope of § 38.001, it will remain especially important for drafters of
contracts, which include limited liability companies or limited partner-
ships as a party, to include fee-shifting provisions that fully and accurately
reflect the intent of the parties.
VIII. CONCLUSION
On the whole, the cases from this Survey period reflect the recurring
theme of unintended consequences arising from the provisions of LLC
and partnership agreements, and highlight steps that attorneys can take
to minimize uncertainty through careful drafting and corporate govern-
ance. First, attorneys must exercise the utmost care at the drafting stage
of partnership and LLC agreements in order to manage clients’ risk and
liability. Provisions that are often considered “boilerplate” must be con-
sidered as part of the overall structure of the partnership to minimize the
risk of unintended consequences for a client’s business.  Further, attor-
neys must consider and account for ambiguities in the TBOC that may
affect their clients’ rights and remedies in the event of litigation. Lastly,
these cases demonstrate the importance of conducting business in a man-
ner that is consistent with the provisions of the operating agreement and
with Texas law, thereby ensuring that the corporate form will be
respected in the event of litigation.
197. Id. at *7.
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